

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03909 01 OF 04 131832Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----090994 131852Z /47
O 131700Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 03909

EXDIS USCTB

E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS:PLENARY MEETING MARCH 10,
USSR STATEMENT

CTB MESSAGE NO.170

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT GIVEN BY MOROKHOV (USSR) AT
PLENARY MEETING HELD MARCH 10, 1978:

BEGIN TEXT: DIRECTOR WARNKE, AMBASSADOR CRADOCK, TODAY
WE WILL ADDRESS ISSUES RELATED TO ON-SITE INSPECTION,
INCLUDING THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PER-
SONNEL DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION.

IN OUR APPROACH TO THESE ISSUES WE PROCEED FROM THE
FOLLOWING PREMISE. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED
BY AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA CONSTITUTE
THE BASIS OF VERIFICATION, AS AGREED BETWEEN THE DELE-
GATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS ARE A SUPPLEMENTARY OR AUXILIARY MEANS
DESIGNED TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03909 01 OF 04 131832Z

ON-SITE INSPECTION MUST BE CARRIED OUT ON THE BASIS OF
VOLUNTARINESS, WHICH THE DELEGATIONS REPRESENTED HERE
AGREE TO.

WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY DIRECTOR
WARNKE BACK ON OCTOBER 19, 1977 TO THE EFFECT THAT
"VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE MUST REST ON A CERTAIN

MEASURE OF TRUST" AND THAT "INSPECTIONS SHOULD SERVE AS A SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF VERIFICATION WHOSE BASIC PURPOSE IS TO ENHANCE TRUST". WE SHARE THIS APPROACH AND BELIEVE THAT PRECISELY ON THIS BASIS A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF ALL ISSUES RELATED TO THE CONDUCT OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS MUST AND CAN BE FOUND.

THUS, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THERE IS COMMON AGREEMENT THAT INSPECTION REQUESTS AND, MOREOVER, ON-SITE INSPECTION ITSELF MUST BE OF AN EXCEPTIONAL, EXTREMELY RARE NATURE. THERE IS PROFOUND POLITICAL MEANING IN THIS, INASMUCH AS THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ENSURING THE VIABILITY OF THE TREATY WOULD BE CREATED BY SUCH A SOLUTION, AS WELL AS THOSE FOR ENHANCING CONFIDENCE IN STRICT COMPLIANCE AND THEREFORE FOR STRENGTHENING MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN TREATY PARTIES.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS SUBMITTED IN THE POLITICAL-LEGAL WORKING GROUP WORKING PAPERS CONTAINING AN ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT OF THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS FOR A MULTILATERAL TREATY AND A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. PROVISIONS ON MAKING REQUESTS, CONDUCTING JOINT CONSULTATIONS, AND MAKING A DECISION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION ARE SET DOWN IN THE WORKING PAPERS IN LOGICAL SEQUENCE. THE PROPOSED PROVISIONS DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT SHOULD SERVE AS GROUNDS FOR RAISING A QUESTION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION, HOW

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03909 01 OF 04 131832Z

APPROPRIATE DECISIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED AND MADE, AND HOW THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION WILL BE DETERMINED. AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, THESE PROVISIONS, AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE SEQUENCE OF CONSIDERING REQUESTS IS CONCERNED, WERE MET WITH UNDERSTANDING BY THE US AND UK REPRESENTATIVES.

THE US DELEGATION HAS PRESENTED IN THE RESPECTIVE WORKING GROUPS CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING GROUNDS FOR MAKING A REQUEST, AND HAS SUBMITTED A WORKING PAPER ON THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL.

TODAY WE WILL GIVE OUR REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS.
1. THE US DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT THE GROUNDS FOR A REQUEST TO CONDUCT AN ON-SITE INSPECTION BE CERTAIN "EVENTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO A QUESTION REGARDING TREATY COMPLIANCE." FOR MANY WEEKS WE HAVE TRIED AT VERY DIFFERENT LEVELS TO GET EXPLANATIONS FROM THE US SIDE ON WHAT IT MEANS BY THIS CONCEPT. HOWEVER, TO THIS DAY WE HAVE YET TO RECEIVE A CONVINCING ANSWER TO OUR LEGITIMATE WISH TO HAVE FULL CLARITY IN THIS MATTER, WHICH IS OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTANCE, SINCE AGREEMENT

ON MANY QUESTIONS RELATED TO ON-SITE INSPECTION DEPENDS ON ITS RESOLUTION.

AT FIRST WE WERE GIVEN AS AN EXAMPLE OF "EVENTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES" SIGNS OF PREPARATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION; THEN THIS EXAMPLE WAS WITHDRAWN AND SUCH "EVENTS" AS CRATERS OR SURFACE BULGING AND VARIOUS OTHER EXAMPLES WERE NAMED. BUT IF ONE WERE TO FOLLOW THIS LOGIC, ONE COULD ADD TO SUCH "EVENTS" OTHERS LIKE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03909 02 OF 04 131834Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----091017 131856Z /41

O 131700Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7142
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 GENEVA 03909

EXDIS USCTB

CTB MESSAGE NO. 170

LIGHTNING, POSSIBLE RADIOACTIVITY CAUSED BY NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, METEOR FALL, CONSTRUCTION WORK, ETC. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WITH SUCH AN AMBIGUOUS, AMORPHOUS DEFINITION OF "EVENT," ONE CAN REACH TOTAL ABSURDITY AND ABSOLUTE ARBITRARINESS.

WE BELIEVE, GENTLEMEN, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO APPROACH THE SOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY. WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT AN AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT CAN BE THE BASIS FOR A REQUEST. WE HAVE MANY TIMES, BOTH AT PLENARY MEETINGS AND IN THE COURSE OF NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS, GIVEN SUBSTANTIATED PROOFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE CORRECTNESS OF PUTTING THE ISSUE THIS WAY. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE STRESSED THAT IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISION ON GROUNDS FOR MAKING AN OSI REQUEST IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT BOTH THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND THE MULTILATERAL TREATY SHOULD CONTAIN SUCH A DEFINITION. THE

DEFINITION WE HAVE PROPOSED WILL CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF
CONFIDENCE -- IN WHICH WE ALL HAVE AN EQUAL DEGREE OF
INTEREST -- THAT VARIOUS NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND OTHER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03909 02 OF 04 131834Z

EVENTS ON THE TERRITORY OF TREATY PARTIES WHICH DO NOT
HAVE DEFINITE SIGNS OF AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
CANNOT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR RAISING A QUESTION OF ON-SITE
INSPECTION. AND THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THE CON-
TEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY.

ONE CANNOT BUT CONCLUDE THAT OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS
ARE TRYING TO GAIN THE RIGHT TO SEEK INSPECTIONS OF EVENTS
OF THE MOST VARIED KIND TAKING PLACE ON THE TERRITORY OF
PARTICIPATING STATES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH DO NOT HAVE
AND CANNOT HAVE ANY RELATION WHATEVER TO TREATY COMPLIANCE.
IN NO WAY CAN WE AGREE TO THIS, SINCE THIS AFFECTS THE
LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR STATE.

WE CALL UPON YOU, GENTLEMEN, TO CLARIFY FULLY THE
QUESTION OF WHAT TYPE OF EVENT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR
MAKING A REQUEST FOR CONDUCTING AN OSI.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN
THAT OUR PROPOSALS DO NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF
PRESENTING ALSO, IN THE COURSE OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN
THE SIDES, "NON-SEISMIC" DATA WHICH GIVE RISE TO DOUBTS
ABOUT TREATY COMPLIANCE. THIS FOLLOWS UNEQUIVOCALLY FROM
THE PROPOSED WORDING.

- 2. IN THE WORDING OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT PROPOSED
BY THE US DELEGATION, THERE IS NO DEFINITION OF THE
OBJECTIVE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION. THIS ISSUE ALSO HAS
PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE LACK OF A DEFINITION OF THE
OBJECTIVE OF INSPECTION IS OBVIOUSLY CONNECTED WITH
EXTREMELY VAGUE WORDING ON THE GROUNDS FOR A REQUEST FOR
CONDUCTING AN OSI. NEITHER THE MOTIVES OF THE REQUEST NOR
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INSPECTION ARE CLEAR. UNDER THESE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03909 02 OF 04 131834Z

CONDITIONS INSPECTION PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO
SEARCH FOR ANYTHING AT ALL IN THE INSPECTION AREA, INCLUD-
ING THINGS WHICH HAD NO RELATION WHATEVER TO THE TASK OF
COMPLYING WITH THE TREATY.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF

AN INSPECTION SHOULD BE TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT AN AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT WAS NOT CAUSED BY AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. INSPECTION PERSONNEL SHOULD THEREFORE CLARIFY ONLY ONE THING -- THAT SUCH AN EXPLOSION DID NOT TAKE PLACE AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE TREATY.

3. THE US PROPOSES THAT AFTER MAKING A REQUEST FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION BUT PRIOR TO MAKING A DECISION AS TO CONDUCTING IT, THE QUESTION OF CERTAIN SITES OR INSTALLATIONS INELIGIBLE FOR INSPECTION IN THE REQUESTED AREA BE CONSIDERED. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE REASONS FOR EXCLUDING SUCH SITES AND INSTALLATIONS BE SET FORTH. WE CANNOT, GENTLEMEN, ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL, BECAUSE UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THERE IS AS YET NO DECISION AS TO AN INSPECTION, A DISCUSSION OF SITES OR INSTALLATIONS EXCLUDED FROM THE INSPECTION CAN LEAD NOT SO MUCH TO A CLARIFICATION OF THE AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT AS TO RECEIVING DATA ON SPECIFIC SITES OR INSTALLATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WHICH ARE CLOSED TO VISITS BY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS.

THE US PROPOSAL DISTURBS US THE MORE SO BECAUSE AFTER SINGLING OUT SUCH SITES AND INSTALLATIONS, THE REQUESTING SIDE CAN CHANGE ITS REQUEST OR EVEN, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WITHDRAW ITS OSI REQUEST ALTOGETHER. THIS CREATES CONDITIONS FOR IRRESPONSIBLE REQUESTS WHICH HAVE NO RELATION TO TREATY COMPLIANCE. SUCH A PROPOSAL AFFECTS THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR STATE.

4. IN HIS STATEMENT OF JANUARY 30 DIRECTOR WARNKE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 GENEVA 03909 02 OF 04 131834Z

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03909 03 OF 04 131835Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----091024 131857Z /41
O 131700Z MAR 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7143
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 GENEVA 03909

EXDIS USCTB

CTB MESSAGE NO. 170

INDICATED: "WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, WE HAVE ADOPTED A NEW APPROACH THAT WILL GIVE US A GREAT DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY TO ADJUST THE INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES AT HAND AND THEREFORE TO AVOID UNNECESSARILY CUMBERSOME INSPECTION VISITS." ON FEBRUARY 1, DIRECTOR WARNKE, SPEAKING ABOUT INSPECTION PROCEDURES, STATED: "IN MY GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL REVIEW OF THIS QUESTION DURING OUR RECENT RECESS, WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S VIEW THAT THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION TEAMS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AT HAND. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE NOW DEVELOPED AN APPROACH THAT PROVIDES SUCH FLEXIBILITY, AND THEREFORE ASSURES THE HOST PARTY THAT IT WILL NOT HAVE TO SHOULDER AN INORDINATELY HEAVY INSPECTION BURDEN."

AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORKING PAPER ON THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL PRESENTED BY THE US SPECIALISTS ON FEB. 14, IN OUR OPINION, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THESE STATEMENTS. THIS PAPER CONTAINS EXCESSIVELY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03909 03 OF 04 131835Z

DETAILED PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF MANDATORY AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY CAN USE, AND MANY OTHER SPECIFIC DETAILS WHICH DEPRIVE THE INSPECTION PROCEDURES OF THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY, DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES AT HAND, AND WHICH LEAD TO EXTREMELY CUMBERSOME INSPECTIONS.

IN SPITE OF THE NUMEROUS AND REPEATED REQUESTS OF OUR EXPERTS TO GIVE THE NECESSARY EXPLANATIONS, THE US SPECIALISTS HAVE AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO JUSTIFY EITHER THE LISTS OF MANDATORY AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT OR THE MANY OTHER DETAILS OF THEIR PROPOSALS. IT IS PERFECTLY APPARENT THAT THIS IS BECAUSE A BOUNDLESS VARIETY OF SPECIFIC SITUATIONS DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN OSI IS POSSIBLE, AND THEREFORE THE TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES OF CONDUCTING ONE CAN BE EXTREMELY VARIED, DEPENDING ON THE

SPECIFIC SITUATIONS.

THE MAIN FACTOR WHICH THE US SPECIALISTS OBVIOUSLY DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IS THAT THE SIDE ON WHOSE TERRITORY AN AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT TOOK PLACE IS ITSELF, MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE, CONCERNED WITH REMOVING POSSIBLE SUSPICIONS OF TREATY VIOLATION AND THEREFORE IN PROVIDING INSPECTION PERSONNEL WITH ALL THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR AN OBJECTIVE INSPECTION.

PROCEEDING FROM THIS PREMISE, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO GIVE A DETAILED DESCRIPTION IN THE AGREEMENT OF THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INSPECTION PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT LISTS, AND OTHER SPECIFIC DETAILS WHICH DEPRIVE INSPECTION PROCEDURES OF THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY. THE RESPECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE WORDED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03909 03 OF 04 131835Z

IN SUCH A WAY THAT IN THE EVENT THAT A DECISION ON OSI IS MADE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF THESE PROVISIONS AND THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION TO AGREE ON INSPECTION PROCEDURES WHICH MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SPECIFIC SITUATION IN THE BEST WAY.

5. THE RIGHTS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HOST PARTY ARE OUTLINED IN GREAT DETAIL IN THE US WORKING PAPER, BUT THE RIGHTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF THE HOST PARTY PERSONNEL ARE SET FORTH SKETCHILY; THIS ATTRACTS ONE'S ATTENTION. MEANWHILE, DIRECTOR WARNKE IN HIS STATEMENT FEBRUARY 1 STRESSED THAT "THE HOST PARTY WILL HAVE EXTENSIVE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES."

WE BELIEVE THAT THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON A BALANCE OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BOTH THE INSPECTION AND HOST PERSONNEL. ON-SITE INSPECTION IS A JOINT ENDEAVOR AND THE JOINT ACTIVITY OF BOTH SIDES BASED ON, TO USE DIRECTOR WARNKE'S EXPRESSION, COOPERATION AND NOT CONFRONTATION.

6. IN SUMMING UP WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, THE SOVIET DELEGATION CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING. THE US PROPOSALS ON MATTERS RELATING TO ON-SITE INSPECTION, INCLUDING THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL, ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED. THEY ARE BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT NOT AN AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT, BUT ANY AMBIGUOUS EVENT, CAN BE GROUNDS FOR AN OSI.

THE PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE US IN CONNECTION WITH REQUESTING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH

THE PRINCIPLE OF ENSURING THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF STATES. THESE PROCEDURES DO NOT TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF THE SIDE BEING INSPECTED

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03909 04 OF 04 131836Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----091037 131858Z /47

O 131700Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7144
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 GENEVA 03909

EXDIS USCTB

CTB MESSAGE NO. 170

IN REMOVING POSSIBLE SUSPICIONS ABOUT TREATY COMPLIANCE.
THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLE, AGREED UPON
BETWEEN THE SIDES, OF ENSURING THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY
IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION
PERSONNEL, CONSIDERING THE DIVERSITY OF SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
WHICH ARISE DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION. THE US
PROPOSALS ARE OVERLOADED WITH EXCESSIVE DETAILS WHICH
INFRINGE UPON THE RIGHTS OF THE HOST SIDE. THEY PERMIT
ARBITRARINESS IN QUESTIONS RELATED TO MAKING A REQUEST FOR
OSI AND CAN LEAD TO VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
SIDE BEING INSPECTED. FOR THESE REASONS THE SOVIET
DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE US PROPOSALS CANNOT SERVE AS
A BASIS FOR REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING
ON MATTERS RELATING TO ON-SITE INSPECTION AND TO THE
RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL.

7. IN OUR OPINION, THE FOLLOWING COULD BE AN ACCEPT-
ABLE, PRACTICAL BASIS FOR DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE PRO-
VISIONS FOR OSI WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SEPARATE AGREE-
MENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03909 04 OF 04 131836Z

THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE THAT AN AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT WHICH MAY RAISE DOUBTS AS TO TREATY COMPLIANCE SERVES AS A BASIS FOR A REQUEST FOR AN OSI. THE OBJECTIVE OF AN INSPECTION IS TO CLARIFY THAT THE AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT WAS NOT CAUSED BY AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL WILL BE DEFINED IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT IN A GENERAL WAY, AS WILL THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE HOST PARTY, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF JOINT ACTIVITY OF BOTH PARTIES' PERSONNEL DURING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTEREST OF THE RECEIVING SIDE IN ALLAYING SUSPICIONS AS TO TREATY VIOLATION. THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES. THE INSPECTION PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS IN THE INSPECTION AREA: CONFIRMING THE FACT THAT THE INSPECTION AREA CORRESPONDS TO THE SITE OF THE AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT WHICH LED TO THE REQUEST FOR AN OSI; CONDUCTING AN UNOBSTRUCTED VISUAL SURVEY OF THE INSPECTION SITE; INVESTIGATING RADIOACTIVITY IN THE INSPECTION AREA. THE SPECIFIC RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INSPECTION PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THE USE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE INSPECTION, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, AFTER A DECISION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION WAS MADE. THE AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE INSPECTION PERSONNEL TO ENJOY PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES SIMILAR TO THOSE DEFINED IN THE PROTOCOL TO THE PNE TREATY OF 1976 BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IS CALLED UPON TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03909 04 OF 04 131836Z

OF PROVISIONS OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, THOSE PERTAINING BOTH TO THE OSI AND TO THE OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION OF VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE BY OUR COUNTRIES, MUCH THE SAME WAY AS THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION EFFECTIVELY WORKS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS.

IN CONCLUSION, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT OUR US AND BRITISH NEGOTIATING PARTNERS WILL ATTENTIVELY STUDY THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE HAVE STATED TODAY, WHICH WERE MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO FIND A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF ALL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE CONDUCT OF OSI. WE PROPOSE THAT THE SPECIFIC STUDY OF THESE ISSUES AND THE

WORKING OUT OF PROVISIONS OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT BE
RELEGATED TO THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUPS. END TEXT.
WARNKE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA03909
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780111-0959
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780377/aaaacmto.tel
Line Count: 497
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 605474c8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3355455
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS:PLENARY MEETING MARCH 10, USSR STATEMENT CTB MESSAGE NO.170
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE USCTB
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/605474c8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014